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While
“safety umbrella” (German: “Rettungsschirm”) is perhaps not the word of the
month, the Solange Reversed proposal suggested by the Bogdandy team makes
a strong case for linking fundamental rights and citizenship. Both are type 1 norms
of constitutionalism, i.e. norms which express fundamental ethical values of a
community and which are therefore generally agreed among democratic actors. As
such, both fundamental norms are uncontested in the way they are defined by Article
2 (fundamental rights) and Article 20 (citizenship rights) of the Lisbon Treaty (TEU),
respectively.
What is novel – and may therefore become subject to contestation – is the change of
‘European’ citizenship practice which follows putting the Solange Reversed proposal
into place, as suggested by the Bogdandy team. This change of legal practice has
political implications. In practice, the proposal involves a branching out of current
‘European’ citizenship practice which is likely to consolidate the European Union’s
genuine normative order. The litmus test of this effect remains the performance
of the European Union (EU) and it’s institutions towards other such orders, to be
sure. In any case, the debate about the proposed change will shed new light on the
political impact of legal integration. So far, the map of European integration has most
decisively been charted by a trail of court rulings. In their sum, these rulings reflect a
strong impact of citizens’ (and residents’) everyday-life in the EU.
Building on some forty years of ‘European’ citizenship practice and a steady line
of sensitive court rulings, the Solange Reversed proposal more substantially and
critically sheds light on the question of stateness, and the familiar link between
sovereignty and stateness. In the following, this comment develops that argument in
some more detail.
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‘European’ Citizenship Practice and Solange Reversed
Put simply, the Solange Reversed proposal adds a new dimension to ‘European’
citizenship practice. In addition to the constitutive relation between an individual
and a polity as the backbone of any type of citizenship, Solange Reversed would
imply an additional relation between the European non-state polity and the member
state polities. The change is derived from the somewhat complex, yet legally highly
efficient, new link between fundamental rights and citizenship legislation. It allows
for a legal practice that is considerably more effective in protecting the fundamental
rights of Union citizens. The following elaborates on this argument with reference to
the trajectory of citizenship practice in the EU.
Two innovations followed from the stipulation of Union citizenship in the 1993
Maastricht Treaty. The first was the direct link between individuals and the European
Union (EU). It indicates that beyond the individual/state relationship as the familiar
constitutive relationship which was constitutive for the emergence of modern
nation-states, now citizenship practice has been extended to include the additional
individual/non-state relationship between each member state citizen and the Union.
This new dimension of citizenship practice has created a space where citizen/state
relations were gradually changing. While modern citizenship consisted in the bundle
of Marshallian citizenship rights, i.e. civil, political and social rights ( T.H. Marshall
1950), the emerging ‘European’ citizenship practice fragmented this model (note
that ‘European’ is put in inverted commas so as to emphasise the exclusion of those
Europeans who are not included in the EU, Wiener 1998 ).
The second innovation was the fragmentation of rights, access and belonging as
the three historical elements of citizenship practice. While the conditions of access
to political participation remained limited to EU and local political participation,
the elements of rights and belonging consistently contributed to the evolving
constitutional quality of the EU. Rights evolved largely unnoticed by political
scientists and politicians, yet carefully and often keenly observed by lawyers as
working citizens within the European market sphere, and now, residing citizens
on EU territory claimed their rights with the courts (compare Marschall, Kalanke,
Kreil, Martinez Sala, Grzelczyk as well as the Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano cases,
respectively). By contrast, the changing degree of belonging went largely unnoticed
by ordinary citizens and social scientists, as pollsters in their wisdom continued to
ask European citizens whether they thought of themselves as Europeans, while
elsewhere belonging was constituted through citizenship practice on an everyday
level, and largely unnoticed to such questioning. Yet, it is precisely this practice
which matters for mapping constitutional change, i.e. accounting for constitutional
quality in any polity.
Different from what lawyers thought at the time when the ink of the Maastricht
signatures was still drying, it turned out that it was law rather than politics which
had most decisive influence on the evolving new type of fragmented citizenship
practice. The Solange Reversed proposal of the Bogdandy Team is a fine example
of a tradition which has become known as “integration through law” (Capelletti, et
al. 1985) among students of European integration. But it leads beyond the general
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thrust of the integration by law literature by putting significantly more weight on the
spirit of the law than on black letter law. The following elaborates on this argument.
Wedding Fundamental Rights to Citizenship
As the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) noticed in its Lisbon ruling,
fundamental rights protection in the EU rests, according to the Lisbon Treaty on
two grounds: The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the unwritten
fundamental rights of the Union. Both are sustained through Article 6, Paragraph
2 of the Lisbon Treaty which empowers and obliges the EU to join the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The unwritten rights leave room for
interpretation of the spirit of the law. Solange Reversed picks up on that.
In a nutshell the Solange Reversed proposal is designed to allow for the EU to
protect fundamental rights of citizens where member states do not comply with their
role as protectors of fundamental rights of individuals. That is, as long as (German:
”solange”) member states do not undermine the fundamental rights of the Union
citizens living on their territory, the EU will see no need to intervene. The main
point of this proposal is to fill the heretofore thin substance of Union citizenship
rights with reference to the “essence of fundamental rights enshrined in Article 2
TEU” (Bogdandy et al., Common Market Law Review 2012, 3, in press).
In other words, the proposal holds that in order to warrant full enjoyment of the
“virtue of their status as citizens” which has first been emphasised by the ECJ’s
Ruiz Zambrano ruling, it is necessary to fill the gap of unwritten fundamental
rights protection in EU citizenship law (Article 20 TEU) with the fundamental rights
protection which is stipulated by Article 2 TEU. Crucially, Article 2 refers fundamental
rights implementation to “an area of freedom, security and justice without internal
frontiers” therefore conjuring the notion of “European legal space” (Bogdandy et al.
2012, 4). By referring to the European legal space in which all citizens – ought to –
enjoy equal fundamental rights protection, yet, stating that the corrective measure of
the EU will not apply as long as member states do not undermine the fundamental
rights of EU citizens living on their territory, the proposal maintains the support
for constitutional pluralism while avoiding the centralisation of fundamental rights
legislation.
Who wins, who loses through this process?
Surely, citizens who feel that their fundamental rights are not respected gain a
further access point for citizenship practice; and the normative order of the EU is
likely to be consolidated through this enhanced citizenship practice. In turn, residents
who do not hold the citizenship of a member state will not directly benefit from
Solange Reversed, even though the new citizenship practice is likely to have more
general implications such as improving the substance of governance across the EU’s
legal space. From the perspective of member states, however, the message of this
change of citizenship practice will be mixed. After all Solange Reversed implies that
the moral conduct of any member state may be challenged by Union citizens and
EU institutions alike. The new branch of ‘European’ citizenship practice has political
implications and therefore offers an interesting perspective on stateness.
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Wider Implications: Changing Stateness
In this concluding section I argue that the Solange Reversed proposal sheds light
on the puzzling perception of a coexistence of pooled sovereignty and unscathed
stateness which is suggested by legal players. Addressing the puzzle with reference
to conduct, it is suggested that the way morality is re-enacted by any actor (not
exclusively states) might be a more fitting indicator for assessing legitimate
stateness than the notion of (state) sovereignty. The following briefly elaborates on
this suggestion.
I contend that both innovations with regard to citizenship practice, i.e. the direct link
between citizens and the EU and the fragmentation of formerly bundled modern
citizenship rights carry substantial political weight. They are therefore key to
understanding and solving the puzzle constituted by the process of shifting sovereign
rights from member states to the EU, on the one hand, yet apparently leaving the
stateness of member states intact, on the other (compare the FCC’s Lisbon ruling on
this perception).
How, we need to ask, can stateness remain untouched, when sovereignty is
removed? What makes stateness, then? And (how) does it matter to what citizens
want?
According to Kant, the practice of government matters more than the form of a state.
In other words, stateness is based on conduct. What states do, matters to their moral
status as partners in the erstwhile modern citizen/state relationship. It follows that, if
the sole indicator for stateness in the EU consists in the right for member states to
leave the EU – as held by the FCC’s 2009 Lisbon ruling – then stateness has come
a long way since Maastricht. If, in addition to this scenario, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) fills in for member states in the role of protector of fundamental rights
of individuals (as in Kadi, Rottmann and other cases), then this is an indicator for
shifting morality. Through enacting the normative structure of meaning-in-use of
fundamental rights, non-state actors thus accumulate moral standing, if you will.
Solange Reversed is likely to sustain this path of legal integration. From a political
science perspective, the proposal offers a welcome opportunity to substantively
scrutinise the concept of stateness. The much used expression of “beyond the state”
just doesn’t do much for understanding a world in which the sum of moral conduct is
not constituted by the parts of state action, any more. Surely, a legal doctrine which
builds on the conduct rather than the form of a state runs contrary of assumptions
about international organisations which maintain a culture of sovereign equality
(Jean L. Cohen, Sovereignty and Globalization – Building Institutions of a Non-State,
2012, in press) even though the EU Treaty is a treaty of international law.
Likewise, and relatedly, we need to assess the conduct of the EU as a non-state
which has accumulated moral substance through the conduct of several of its
institutions, not least the ECJ. One analytical focus for such a check-up is provided
by the concept of citizenship practice as the process which links the individual
with a polity or, as in the European case, with multiple polities, and – with Solange
Reversed – it links different types of polities as well. Examining this practice includes
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the three historical elements of citizenship: the implementation of the modern rights
triad, conditions of access to political participation and the development of belonging
to a community. In other words, and with implications for global non-state/state
actor relationships more generally, the outcome of focused scrutiny with regard to
fundamental rights protection will reveal the changing moral character of states and
non-states alike.
Antje Wiener is a professor for political science at the University of Hamburg.
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